



Say that metaphysical indeterminacy occurs just when there is a
fact such that neither it nor its negation obtains. The aim of this work
is to shed light on the issue of whether orthodox quantum mechanics
provides any evidence of metaphysical indeterminacy by discussing the
logical, semantic, and broadly methodological presuppositions of the
debate. I argue that the dispute amounts to a verbal disagreement
between classical and quantum logicians, given Eli Hirsch’s account of
substantivity; but that it need not be so if Ted Sider’s naturalness-
based account of substantivity is adopted instead. Given the latter ap-
proach, can anything be said in order to tip the balance of the dispute
either way? Some prima facie reasonable constraints on naturalness
entail that the classicist is right, and the quantum world is therefore
determinate. Nevertheless, there are reasons for weakening those con-
straints, to the effect that the dispute remains very much open. Finally,
I discuss alternative accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy, and ar-
gue that they are unsuitable for framing the quantum indeterminacy
debate.
Keywords: disagreement; metaphysical indeterminacy; quantum
indeterminacy; quantum logic; nonclassical logic; natural properties.
1 Introduction
A significant shift in the recent literature about indeterminacy concerns the
idea that the phenomenon of indeterminacy could originate not only from
the way we represent the world, but also from the world itself. Representa-
tional indeterminacy arises when the way we describe reality, linguistically or
otherwise, is somehow defective.1 Worldly, aka metaphysical indeterminacy
occurs just when it is indeterminate what reality is like, irrespectively of
1Representational indeterminacy is usually construed along semantic or epistemic lines.
The locus classicus for a semantic treatment of representational indeterminacy is Fine [20].
The alternative, epistemic account dates back to Williamson [47].
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how it is represented.2 In this work I will be concerned with indeterminacy
of the worldly variety.
Since quantum mechanics is arguably the most successful scientific the-
ory at our disposal, it is only reasonable that close attention should be paid
to any evidence which that theory may have to offer in favor or against meta-
physical indeterminacy. It is a well known fact that, according to Heisen-
berg’s uncertainty principle, it is impossible to assign a sharp value to each
experimental property, aka observable of a system at the same time. There
are sets of observables—like position and momentum, or spin components
along different directions—such that the sharper one of the observables, the
less sharp the remaining ones in the same set.
A growing number of philosophers have defended, or at least entertained
the idea that the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics provides us
with reasons to believe that reality is indeterminate (Bokulich [7], Calosi and
Wilson [9] [10], Darby [14], Darby and Pickup [15], Lewis [29, ch. 4], Lowe
[30] [31], Skow [39], Torza [40], Williams [45]). Nevertheless, a cursory survey
of the literature will show that not only we have not reached a consensus on
the issue, but it has also been argued that interpreting quantum mechanics as
supporting metaphysical indeterminacy is hasty, if not misguided (Noonan
[35], Glick [21]).3
In this work I will not take sides on the first-order debate as to whether
the world is, at the quantum level, indeterminate. Instead, I will attempt to
shed light on that debate by addressing a number of (mostly) higher-order
questions, namely:
• How is the debate about quantum metaphysical indeterminacy best
understood in light of the underlying logic?
• Is the debate substantive, or is it merely verbal?
• If the debate is substantive, are there any higher-order considerations
that could tip the balance of the first-order debate either way?
I will start off by taking a first stab at a characterization of metaphysi-
cal indeterminacy (section 2). Next comes a discussion of the main logical
frameworks that are typically associated with quantum theory, namely clas-
sical logic and quantum logic. I will argue that metaphysical indeterminacy
2Among the proposed accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy are Akiba [1], Barnes
and Williams [5], Torza [40], Williams [46], Williamson [48], Wilson [50].
3For an overview of the state of the art on quantum indeterminacy, see Calosi and
Mariani [8].
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will arise if we interpret quantum mechanics on a quantum logical space, and
it won’t if we interpret it on a classical logical space. Since both options are
admissible, a stalemate is reached (section 3). As it turns out, the stalemate
is rooted in the fact that the disagreement between the two parties—the ad-
vocates of classical vs quantum logic—regarding quantum indeterminacy is
verbal (section 4). Such a deflationary moral can be avoided by adopting a
stricter characterization of metaphysical indeterminacy, as well as of verbal
disagreement. In particular, if we embrace a metaphysics of naturalness, the
quantum MI debate need not be verbal; and it is substantive provided that
either classical or quantum negation is natural (section 5). Some prima facie
reasonable constraints on naturalness entail that quantum negation cannot
be natural, which lends support to the no-indeterminacy view of quantum
mechanics. However, I will make a case for adopting less demanding con-
straints on naturalness, which do not tip the balance of the debate either
way. On such grounds, the dispute on quantum MI remains very much
open (section 6). Finally, I will explain why I have not adopted one of the
main characterizations of MI in the market—the precisificational account of
Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams, or the determinable-based account
of Jessica Wilson. I explain that the former is unable to model MI of the
quantum variety; whereas the latter rules out quantum logic on dubious
metaphysical grounds (section 7).
2 Metaphysical indeterminacy
I am going to assume two constraints on any viable characterization of
MI. First of all, MI should be defined solely by reference to worldly items,
whether concrete or abstract (individuals, properties, facts, operations, etc),
as opposed to representational items (names, predicates, sentences, opera-
tors, etc). MI being a thesis about the world, a roundabout approach ap-
pealing to representational machinery is best avoided. This assumption is
meant to guarantee that MI is indeed characterized as a worldly, rather than
a representational phenomenon.
There are two reasons for avoiding a characterization of MI in terms of
representational items. One reason is that such a characterization might
overgenerate cases of MI due to potential defectiveness of the representa-
tional items being employed. For instance, if MI is characterized by appeal-
ing to the representational properties of a language L, we will inevitably
end up with false positives of MI if some term of L is semantically vague
or irreferential. Although we might be able to rule out the false positives
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by imposing strict conditions on L, the strategy comes at a price, in that
substantive semantic assumptions will have to be made.4 Another reason
not to appeal to representational items in characterizing MI is that, since
any representational medium (such as a language) suffers from some expres-
sive limitation or other, there is always risk that such a characterization will
undergenerate cases of MI.
The second constraint is that, other things being equal, we should prefer
a characterization that makes metaphysical indeterminacy structurally simi-
lar to its representational counterpart, in such a way that the two phenomena
will share some important feature in virtue of which they can both be said to
be notions of indeterminacy. Because this is merely a ceteris paribus condi-
tion, it does not rule out in principle the viability of a gerrymandered notion
of indeterminacy, whereby the representational and metaphysical cases share
no nontrivial features. However, unless we have good reasons to believe that
our use of the term ‘indeterminacy’ for referring to both phenomena is noth-
ing more than an unfortunate ambiguity, I take nondisjunctive conceptions
to be preferable.
With that being said, here is a first-pass characterization to the effect
that MI arises just when there is a gap in logical space. (A finer characteri-
zation is put forward in section 5.2.)
ind. Metaphysical indeterminacy is said to occur if there is a fact such
that neither it nor its negation obtains.
A few observations are in order. First of all, I am using ‘fact’ as synony-
mous with ‘state of affairs’, in such a way that facts are the nonrepresenta-
tional correlates of propositions (cf. Williamson [48, p. 699]). On this view,
the fact that Marie is Canadian exists whether Marie is or is not Canadian;
and the fact that Marie is Canadian obtains if and only if Marie is Canadian.
In the following discussion I will be implement a coarse-grained construal of
facts, to the effect that facts F,G are identical if and only if it is necessarily
the case that F obtains if and only if G obtains (relative to a given logical
space).5
4The issue is illustrated by the characterization of MI put forward in Torza [40], ac-
cording to which MI occurs just when (roughly) there is a sentence in a semantically
nondefective language L which is neither true nor false. As Torza points out, his char-
acterization runs into false positives of MI unless one assumes (i) a Russellian account of
definite descriptions, and (ii) either a negative or a positive free semantics for L.
5Although facts can be taken to be metaphysically fundamental (Rayo [37], Turner
[42]), I will refrain from taking sides on such matters, which are orthogonal to the present
concerns.
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Second, ind meets the constraint that only worldly items should be em-
ployed in defining MI. Indeed, three kinds of items are mentioned in the
definiens: fact, negation, and obtaining. Each of them contributes to the
objective, mind-independent structure of logical space, defined as a collec-
tion of facts together with whatever structure is required for the interpre-
tation of our logical vocabulary.6 Insofar as the structure of logical space is
worldly, so are the entities mentioned in ind.
The above definition of MI also meets the desideratum that metaphys-
ical and representational indeterminacy should be structurally similar. In
particular, if ‘sentence’, ‘negation (operator)’ and ‘is true’ are substituted in
ind for ‘fact’, ‘negation (operation)’ and ‘obtains’, respectively, we end up
with a characterization of representational indeterminacy which is shared
by a number of standard theories, among them supervaluationism. A rele-
vant example of representational indeterminacy is provided by the sentence
‘Laura is tall’, which will be neither true nor false if ‘tall’ is a vague pred-
icate having Laura as a borderline case. Mutatis mutandis, if ‘sentence’,
‘negation (operator)’ and ‘is knowable to be true’ are substituted in ind for
‘fact’, ‘negation (operation)’ and ‘obtains’, respectively, we end up with a
characterization of representational indeterminacy along epistemicist lines.
I do not expect the above characterization of MI to be uncontroversial,
mainly because it differs substantially from the two main options on the mar-
ket: the precisificational account of Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams,
and the determinable-based account of Jessica Wilson. I will return to those
alternatives in section 7, where it is argued that they both run into impor-
tant problems when it comes to modeling quantum indeterminacy.
3 Logical space
3.1 Classical logical space
The objective, mind-independent space of absolutely all possibilities is known
as logical space. This paper deals with logical space in a restricted sense,
namely as the mind-independent space of all nomological possibilities (i.e.,
possibilities compatible with the relevant laws of nature). Whenever I am
considering a particular physical system, by ‘logical space’ I will mean the
space of what is nomologically possible for that system.
6Note that in ind by ‘negation’ I mean an objective, worldly operation in logical space
mapping facts to facts, and not a linguistic, representational operator mapping formulas
to formulas.
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The definition of a logical space can proceed from different choices of
basic elements: individuals, properties, worlds etc. I am going to assume
that any logical space meets the following conditions: (i) it features a class
of facts; (ii) it is endowed with a relational property of obtaining-at; and
(iii) it is closed under a number of logical operations. Once (i)-(iii) are in
place, logical spaces can be employed in order to define a model theory for
sentential logic in the standard way.
A classical logical space is a structure C = 〈C,@,TC ,−C ,uC , 〉 such that:
1. C is a set of entities playing the role of possible maximal states, aka
worlds. Among them is a distinguished maximal state @, the actual
world.
2. Facts are sets of worlds. The total set C is the necessary fact; the
empty set is the impossible fact.
3. A fact P is said to obtain at world w (in symbols, TC(P,w)) if w ∈ P ;
it is said to obtain simpliciter if TC(P,@).
4. Logical operations are identified with the standard set-theoretic opera-
tions over C: factual negation (−CP ) is complementation, and factual
conjunction (P uC Q) is intersection.
The factual disjunction P tC Q is defined as −C(−CP uC −CQ), which is
set-theoretic union.
Classical logical space thus defined meets the aforementioned conditions
(i)-(iii). Classical (sentential) logic is the logic obtained by interpreting a
sentential language on a classical logical space, and identifying logical truth
with truth in all classical logical spaces.7
It is straightforward to see that MI cannot occur in classical logical space
as defined above. Indeed, for any fact P , either @ ∈ P or @ /∈ P . Therefore,
either @ ∈ P or @ ∈ −CP ; which is to say, either P or its classical negation
obtains.
3.2 Quantum logical space
The orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics is typically associated
with three principles: the Schrödinger equation, which defines the dynamics
7It goes without saying that this way of modeling logical space does not commit one to
full-blown modal realism, or to any substantive thesis typically associated with Lewisean
metaphysics, since in the present context ‘world’ is being used merely as an umbrella term
compatible with alternative views about the foundations of modality.
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of a system; the Born rule, which specifies the probabilities of quantum
experiments; and the eingestate-eigenvalue link, which provides necessary
and sufficient conditions for ascribing a physical property to a system given
its state. Instead of stating those principles here, I will do so when required.
The truth of the orthodox interpretation will be assumed throughout.8
The transition to the realm of quantum physics makes the task of deter-
mining the structure of logical space more challenging. The standard way
of representing a space of possible states of a quantum system appeals to
a particular kind of structure known as a Hilbert space.9 What matters for
present purpose is that a Hilbert space H is a vector space, and is therefore
closed under linear combination of vectors; and that the state of a system
is represented by a unitary vector. One ubiquitous feature of quantum sys-
tems is the phenomenon of superposition, which is understood via linear
combination. In the language of Hilbert spaces: if |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 are states in H,
then for any real or complex scalars α, β, α|ψ1〉+ β|ψ2〉 is also a state in H,
and is said to be a superposition of |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉.
One might think that, by analogy with the classical case, we already have
all we need in order to specify a quantum logical space: quantum states are
unitary vectors in a Hilbert space; facts are sets of vectors; obtaining-at
is defined by set-membership; and logical operations are the standard set-
theoretic ones. If that is the case, MI is also ruled out in the quantum world.
This conclusion, however, runs afoul of some reasonable constraints.
A physically meaningful, aka experimental fact is a fact consisting of a
system having some physical property. The class of physical properties is
the smallest class comprising both determinate physical quantities and log-
ical compounds thereof. An example of a fact involving some determinate
physical quantity is an electron’s having spin up along a specified direction.
An example of a fact involving some logical compound of determinate phys-
ical quantities is an electron’s having either spin up or spin down along a
specified direction.
8Although the orthodox interpretation is often paired with an instrumentalist attitude
toward quantum theory, it seems to me that a realist reading is more natural. Indeed, the
eigenstate-eigenvalue link, which establishes a connection between formalism and physical
properties, is incompatible with some of the main available realist interpretations. (Sim-
ilar considerations carry over to the Criterion of Reality discussed later in this section.)
Cf. Bokulich [7, p. 460 fn. 14] for a defense of a realist attitude toward the orthodox
interpretation.
9A Hilbert space is defined as a complete vector space with an inner product. Hilbert
spaces can be finitely or infinitely dimensional. Although I will restrict my attention to
the finite case, the metaphysical moral discussed here carries over to infinitely dimensional
spaces.
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If S is an experimental fact, let Pr(S, |ψ〉) ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that
S obtains upon measurement provided that the state of the system is |ψ〉.
The Criterion of Reality, which was first stated by Einstein, Podolski and
Rosen [18, p. 777] within the context of the debate concerning the descrip-
tive completeness of quantum mechanics, says that ‘if, without in any way
disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability
equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element
of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.’ This principle
‘provides us with a sufficient condition for an electron to have a spin prop-
erty, namely if we can predict with probability 1 the spin we will obtain on
measurement’ (Lewis [29, p. 28]).
As stated, the Criterion of Reality will apply to all facts consisting of a
system’s having some determinate physical quantity. But, I claim, it should
also hold for logically complex facts, if it holds at all. For example, we want
to say that if the probability that an electron is found in a given region R
is 1, then the electron is located in that region. But if r0, r1, . . . , rn is a
partition of R, being located in R is tantamount to the complex property of
being located in r0 or being located in r1 or. . . or being located in rn. So,
we will also want to say that if the probability that an electron is found in
region r0 or it is found in region r1 or. . . or it is found in region rn is 1 then
the electron is located in r0 or it is located in r1 or. . . or it is located in rn.
The above point holds with a proviso. One might worry that being lo-
cated in a region cannot amount to being located in one of its subregions.
For the partition can be defined in such a way that the individual cells
r0, r1, . . . , rn are arbitrarily small, so that being located in any particular
cell ri asymptotically amounts to having definite position—which contra-
dicts the fact that a quantum particle can be located in a region R while
lacking definite position. However, the worry rests on a compositional ac-
count of logical operations, whereby a disjunctive fact obtains just in case
one of the disjuncts obtains. Thus, extending the Criterion of Reality to
complex facts is not in contradiction with the empirical evidence, as long as
compositionality is abandoned. (I will return to the issue of compositionality
at the end of this subsection.)
Now, if we assume that the Criterion of Reality indeed holds for experi-
mental facts of arbitrary logical complexity, we can state it as follows, for S
an experimental fact:
cr. If Pr(S, |ψ〉) = 1 then S obtains at |ψ〉.
Recently, Maudlin [32, p. 6] has gone so far as to claim that the Criterion
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of Reality is analytic.10 Be that as it may, since the Criterion of Reality is
widely regarded as a minimal tenet of realism about quantum mechanics, it
will not be unreasonable to assume it, provided that quantum mechanics is
a reliable guide to the structure of reality.11
What makes cr relevant to the present discussion is that it entails the
following condition:
closure. If |ψ〉 is a superposition of |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, . . . |ψn〉, and S obtains at
each |ψi〉i≤n, then S obtains at |ψ〉.12
In other words, an experimental fact obtaining at each vector component
of a state |ψ〉 will also obtain at |ψ〉. An immediate corollary is that the ex-
perimental facts of quantum mechanics are closed under linear combination
(Birkhoff and von Neumann [6, p. 826]).
We can now see that the initial sketch of quantum logical space went
too fast, in that it assumed that any set of vectors in a Hilbert space can
be identified with some physically meaningful fact, whereas only a special
subclass of them can, namely the closed ones. Because of that, complemen-
tation cannot play the role of factual negation, since in general it does not
map closed sets to closed sets. For example, in a two-dimensional z-spin
Hilbert space for a single spin-12 particle, the set-theoretic complement of
the fact that the particle is z-spin up is not a necessary fact and contains
an orthonormal basis, and is therefore not closed.
The above remarks motivate the introduction of quantum logical space
(Birkhoff and von Neumann [6]) which is a structureQ = 〈H, |ψ@〉,TQ,−Q,uQ〉
such that:
1. H is a Hilbert space, where unitary vectors are possible maximal states.
Among them is an actual state |ψ@〉.
2. Facts are sets of vectors in H closed under linear combination. The
total set is the necessary fact, whereas the empty set is the impossible
fact.
10But see Glick and Boge [21] for a dissenting voice.
11Could one accept the Criterion of Reality while denying cr on the grounds that the
‘element of physical reality’ need not be the predicted property itself? That is certainly
an admissible view, but not the intended one in the EPR paper: “in the state given by
[ψ = e(2πi/h)p0x], the momentum has certainly the value p0. It thus has meaning to say
that the momentum of the particle in the state given by [that equation] is real” (Einstein,
Podolski and Rosen [18, p. 778], my emphasis).
12Proof: The Born rule, which specifies the probabilities of quantum experiments, tells
us that if |ψ〉 = α1|ψ1〉 + . . . + αn|ψn〉 and S obtains at |ψi〉 then Pr(S, |ψ〉) = |αi|2,
where |α1|2 + . . . + |αn|2 = 1. Since S is assumed to obtain at |ψi〉, for each i ≤ n, then
Pr(S, |ψ〉) = 1. By cr, we can conclude that S obtains at |ψ〉.
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3. A fact S is said to obtain at |ψ〉 (in symbols, TQ(S, |ψ〉)) if |ψ〉 ∈ S;
it is said to obtain simpliciter if TQ(S, |ψ@〉).
4. The following are logical operations on Q:
(a) factual negation (−QS) is orthocomplementation. The orthocom-
plement of a fact S is the set of vectors that are orthogonal to
each vector in S.
(b) factual conjunction (S uQ T ) is intersection.
The factual disjunction S tQ T is defined as −Q(−QS uQ −CT ), which
corresponds to span. The span of S, T is the closure of the set-theoretic
union S tC T under linear combination.
Quantum logical space thus defined meets conditions (i)-(iii) as stated in
section 3.1. Quantum (sentential) logic is the logic obtained by interpreting
a sentential language on quantum logical space, and identifying logical truth
with truth in all quantum logical spaces.13
One can now see that MI will arise in quantum logical space, for if
|ψ@〉 is neither a member of S nor a member of its orthocomplement, then
neither S nor −QS obtains. For example, consider a one-electron system
where S is the fact that the electron e is spin up along the z direction (i.e.,
S = {α| ↑z〉e : α ∈ C}). The orthocomplement −QS is none other than the
fact that e is spin down along the z direction (i.e., −QS = {α| ↓z〉e : α ∈ C}).
If |ψ@〉 = 1√2(| ↑z〉e + | ↓z〉e), then |ψ@〉 /∈ S and |ψ@〉 /∈ −QS, which means
that it is metaphysically indeterminate whether e is spin up or spin down
along the z direction.
There is one last issue that was left pending. The argument I offered in
support of closure relies on a strong reading of the Criterion of Reality,
captured by cr, which applies not only to facts involving a determinate
property, but also to facts involving logical complex properties. My justifi-
cation for the strong reading hinged on a rejection of compositionality. That
move would now look suspicious, however, if cr had been wielded to intro-
duce a compositional logical space. The worry can be put to rest, insofar as
13Putnam [36] argued that quantum logic is the one true logic; and that the paradoxes of
quantum mechanics, especially the measurement problem, are solved by adopting quantum
logic (cf. Bacciagaluppi [3]). What I have said so far does not entail either of Putnam’s
theses. Indeed, quantum logic’s being the correct logic for modeling reasoning about
quantum systems is compatible with both quantum logic’s not being the one true logic,
and with the measurement problem’s not being solvable by appealing to quantum logic.
Nevertheless, the question whether classical or quantum logic is the the one true logic is
relevant to the present debate, and I will return to it in section 5.
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quantum logic is clearly noncompositional. For example, if our one-electron
system is in a superposition of z-spin states, the fact that e is either z-spin
up or z-spin down (i.e., StQ−QS) will obtain, even though neither disjunct
obtains. The reason is that the span of the set {S,−QS} coincides with the
necessary fact in the quantum logical space for the system at hand.
3.3 Stalemate
We have seen that MI arises in quantum mechanics, if this is interpreted on
a quantum logical space. The logical classicist will not go down so easily,
however. The idea that our best theories are determinate is deeply ingrained
in the history of science and especially physics, as Eddy Chen reminds us:
“All the paradigm cases of candidate fundamental laws of nature are
not only simple and universal, but also exact, in the sense that, for
every class of worlds (or class of solutions), fundamental laws either
determinately apply or determinately fail. [. . . ] The kind of mathe-
matics we are used to, built from a set-theoretic foundation, does not
lend itself naturally to model the genuine fuzziness and indeterminacy
of vagueness” (Chen [12]).
In a similar vein, here is an argument to the effect that quantum me-
chanics does not support logical revisionism in general, and quantum logic
in particular:
Quantum mechanics is formulated in classical mathematics, which
obeys classical logic. Since the intended semantics for classical logic is
bivalent, there is a straightforward way of interpreting quantum me-
chanics in such a way that every quantum fact is such that either it
or its negation obtains. Hence, not only quantum mechanics does not
force the adoption of a quantum logical space upon us, but its default
interpretation involves a classical logical space.
The gist of the classicist’s rejoinder is that since the structure of a Hilbert
space boils down to classical linear algebra which, as any run-of-the-mill
mathematical theory, is interpretable on a classical logical space, the tran-
sition from classical to quantum physics does not require a transition from
classical to quantum logic spaces, and so provides no support for MI.14
14It is worth noting that MI is prima facie compatible with conservatism about logic. In-
deed, the account of MI due to Wilson [50] is formulated against the backdrop of a classical
and bivalent logic (but see sec. 7 for criticism). Likewise, the model theory of MI developed
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By way of example, consider an equation of the form Ô|ψ〉 = λ|ψ〉,
where Ô is a linear operator associated with the observable property O.
Both the classical and the quantum logician will agree that the equation
expresses the fact that the system has property O with value λ.15 In a
Hilbert space, that fact is identified with the set S of unitary vectors differing
from |ψ〉 by a scalar. According to the classicist, however, the (classically)
negated sentence Ô|ψ〉 6= λ|ψ〉 also expresses a fact, corresponding to the
set-theoretic complement of S. The quantum logician, on the other hand,
will insist that Ô|ψ〉 6= λ|ψ〉 as uttered by the classicist has no experimental
meaning, since it does not pick out a closed set, and therefore fails to express
a physically meaningful fact about the system at hand.
We seem to have reached a stalemate. Quantum logicians will address
the opponents with the following speech:
You think you can avoid MI by introducing redundant structure, namely
by postulating semantic values for sentences governed by classical con-
nectives. But those extra ‘facts’ of yours have no physical content, and
should therefore be purged from the logical space of quantum physics.
Classicists, on the other hand, will likely stick to their guns and reply:
You identify facts with closed sets in a Hilbert space. But closed
sets only constitute a subclass of all facts statable in the language
of quantum mechanics, viz. the ones associated with some possible
experiment. MI results from unduly restricting the class of facts to the
experimental facts.
by Barnes and Williams [5] validates all classical schemas and inference rules, and makes
every (semantically precise) statement either true or false. However, the Barnes-Williams
strategy is precisificational and, as I explain in sec. 7, precisificational approaches have
proven unsuitable to modeling quantum indeterminacy. Moreover, the Barnes-Williams
model recovers bivalence by driving a wedge between truth and determinacy, insofar as it
does not validate the inference from p to Dp (where D is an object-language metaphysical
determinacy operator), while failing to explain what it means for the world to contain a
truthmaker for the former but not the latter. (Cameron [11] suggests that it amounts to
p’s truthmaker to exist but not definitely so, which merely pushes the bump under the
rug.)
15This inference assumes the eigenstate-eigenvalue link : a quantum system has property
O with value λ iff the quantum state of the system is in an eigenstate of the associated
operator Ô with eigenvalue λ. The eigenstate-eigenvalue link is a tenet of the orthodox
interpretation of quantum mechanics (sec. 3.2). It is worth noting however that David
Wallace has argued that the eigenstate-eigenvalue link has never belonged to the orthodox
interpretation (Wallace [43]), and that it is false (Wallace [44]). See Gilton [24] for a defense
of the eigenstate-eigenvalue link as a traditional component of the orthodox interpretation.
Whether the link is indeed correct is a question that lies beyond the scope of this work.
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Since one party affirms and the other denies that quantum mechanics
leads to MI, one’s knee jerk reaction might be to search for faulty premises
on either side of the debate. In the next section I will argue instead that
the stalemate may be an illusion, insofar as the dispute between classical
and quantum logician turns out to be merely verbal, given a standard un-
derstanding of what counts as a verbal dispute.
4 Substantivity
In the present section, I am going to offer necessary and sufficient conditions
for a debate to be verbal (nonsubstantive) by drawing on Hirsch [22] [23].
Once the relevant concepts are in place, I will employ them in order to assess
the substantivity of the debate on quantum MI.
Let LA,LB be interpreted languages spoken by A,B, respectively, and
let p be a sentence formulated in the common vocabulary. The two parties
are said to be having a verbal disagreement about p’s truth just in case:
1. there is a two-way paraphrase between LA and LB;
2. p is true-in-LA iff it is not true-in-LB.
A couple of observations are in order. First, p’s being true-in-LA means
that the semantics of LA maps p to an actually obtaining fact. Second, to
say that LA can be paraphrased into LB means that there is a mapping f
of LA-sentences to LB-sentences that preserves coarse-grained content, i.e.,
such that p expresses-in-LA fact S only if f(p) expresses-in-LB fact S. The
existence of a two-way paraphrase is crucial to capturing the notion that the
parties are not disagreeing on any worldly matters, even though they may
describe things differently.
I am going to start by arguing that the above condition (1) is satisfied
by LC ,LQ, where C,Q are the classical and quantum logician, respectively.
The crux of the argument I am about to offer is that, although C and Q
disagree about the truth value of sentences concerning the quantum world
because of the different interpretations they assign to the negation symbol,
the disagreement can be reconciled by appealing to further expressive re-
sources. In particular, the classicist can charitably interpret the quantum
logician in probabilistic terms, whereas the quantum logician can charitably
interpret the classicist by semantic ascent to a classical metalanguage.
Categorical sentences are sentences about a physical system that do not
involve intensional operators, truth predicates, (in)determinacy operators,
or anything of the sort. Atomic categorical sentences of quantum mechanics
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are sentences that ascribe determinate physical quantities to a system—e.g.,
‘t1, . . . , tn are in such and such position’, or ‘t1, . . . , tn have such and such
spin’. Under informationally ideal conditions there is going to be no dis-
agreement between a classicist and a quantum logician regarding the truth
values of those sentences. Compound categorical sentences are recursively
defined by the application of sentential operators (∧,¬) to categorical sen-
tences, and ascribe logical compounds of determinate physical quantities to
a system.16 Since the categorical fragments of LC and LQ only differ by the
way the negation symbol is interpreted, the relevant disagreement between
the two parties will only arise in the case of compound categorical sentences.
In order to show that C and Q disagree verbally, we need to provide a
paraphrase from the categorical fragment of LC into LQ, and a paraphrase
from the categorical fragment of LQ into LC . Let us start with the latter.
Before giving a precise definition, it will help to state the main idea with an
example. When the quantum logician asserts an atomic categorical sentence
of LQ, say ‘e is z-spin up’, the classicist can charitably interpret it as picking
out the fact expressed-in-LC by ‘the probability that e is found to be up on
a z-spin measurement is 1’.17 And when the quantum logician asserts ‘e is
not z-spin up’, the classicist can charitably interpret it as picking out the
fact expressed-in-LC by ‘the probability that e is found to be up on a z-spin
measurement is 0’.
Now, for any speaker A and sentence P of LA, let the fact [P ]A be the
interpretation-in-LA of P . A paraphrase f from the categorical fragment of
LQ into LC is recursively defined as follows:
(AtQ) If p is an atomic categorical sentence of LQ, then f(p) is Pr([p]C , |ψ@〉)
= 1.
(¬Q) If P is a categorical sentence of LQ, then f(¬P ) is Pr([f(P )]C , |ψ@〉) =
0.
(∧Q) If S, P are categorical sentences of LQ, then f(S∧P ) is Pr([f(S)]C , |ψ@〉)
= 1 ∧Pr([f(P )]C , |ψ@〉) = 1.
16I will be assuming that sentences such as ‘t is in region R’ or ‘t has z-spin’ are covert
compound categorical sentences analyzable as ‘t has location x1 or. . . or xn (and R is the
fusion of x1, . . . , xn)’ and ‘t has z-spin up or z-spin down’, respectively. In section 7, I will
consider—and ultimately reject—an alternative interpretation, due to Jessica Wilson, to
the effect that an expression like ‘. . . has z-spin’ does not ascribe a disjunctive property of
z-spin determinates, but rather a nondisjunctive z-spin determinable property.
17In fact, probability talk is dispensable in the atomic case, as the two parties assign the
same interpretation to the primitive physical vocabulary. For sake of uniformity, however,
I will deploy a probabilistic paraphrase throughout.
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It can be proven that f preserves coarse-grained content (see sec. A.1
of the appendix). This suffices to show that the classicist can charitably
interpret the other party as speaking the truth.
What about the converse, though? It is not as straightforward that the
quantum logician can paraphrase the classicist’s categorical assertions into
her own language. As it turns out, that is possible by semantic ascent to a
classical metalanguage. When the classicist asserts the atomic categorical
LC-sentence ‘e is z-spin up’, the quantum logician can charitably interpret
it as picking out the fact expressed-in-LQ by “e is z-spin up’ is true’. And
when the classicist asserts ‘e is not z-spin up’, the other party can charitably
interpret that sentence as picking out the fact expressed-in-LQ by “e is z-spin
up’ is not true’, where the latter ‘not’ is classical. Of course there is nothing
problematic with the quantum logician using classical negation, or classical
ideology in general, as long as it operates on noncategorical statements such
as “e is z-spin up’ is true’, as opposed to categorical statements such as ‘e
is z-spin’.
With that in mind, let us assume that LQ is endowed with
i. a classical truth predicate T such that, for any categorical LQ-sentence
P , T (P ) is LQ-true iff TC([P ]Q, |ψ@〉);
ii. a classical negation operator ∼, such that for any noncategorical LQ-
sentence P , ∼ P is LQ-true iff P is not LQ-true;
iii. a classical conjunction operator &, such that for any noncategorical
LQ-sentences S and P , S&P is LQ-true iff both S and P are LQ-true.
A paraphrase g from the categorical fragment of LC to LQ is defined as
follows:
(AtC) If p is an atomic categorical sentence of LC , then g(p) is T (p).
(¬C) If P is a categorical sentence of LC , then g(¬P ) is ∼ g(P ).
(∧C) If S, P are categorical sentences of LC , then g(S ∧ P ) is g(S)&g(P ).
It can be proven that g preserves coarse-grained content (see sec. A.2 of
the appendix).
Now we know that condition (1) in the definition of verbal disagreement
is satisfied, as there exists a paraphrase g from the categorical fragment of
LC into LQ, and a paraphrase f from the categorical fragment of LQ into
LC . Condition (2) is also satisfied, for when electron e is in a superposition
of z-spin up and z-spin down, the sentence ‘e is not z-spin up’ is true-in-LC
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and not true-in-LQ. Therefore, in such circumstances the dispute between
classical and quantum logician regarding the truth of ‘e is not z-spin up’ will
be verbal in Hirsch’s sense. In fact, the two parties can in general disagree
merely verbally about the truth value of compound categorical statements
involving negation.
But there is more. When e is in a superposition of z-spin up and z-spin
down, neither ‘e is z-spin up’ nor ‘e is not z-spin up’ is true-in-LQ; and
since ‘e is z-spin up’ expresses-in-LQ a fact, and ‘not’ expresses-in-LQ the
quantum negation operation, it is true-in-LQ that quantum mechanics en-
tails MI. On the other hand, the classicist’s interpretation of LC is bivalent;
so it is not true-in-LC that quantum mechanics entails MI. Therefore the
debate on whether quantum mechanics leads to MI is also verbal. (For a
detailed argument, which requires the introduction of an object-language
indeterminacy operator, see section A.3 of the appendix.)
In fact, a further consequence can be drawn. Recall that MI is being
construed as indeterminacy originating in the world itself, rather than in
the way the world is represented. In light of what we just learned, however,
the answer to the question ‘Is there any indeterminacy independent of our
representations?’ turns out not to be independent of our representations.
We seem to have found evidence supporting a relativistic view to the effect
that there is no Archimedean point from which the very question of MI can




In the previous section we reached the twofold conclusion that the ques-
tion as to whether quantum mechanics entails MI is verbal; and that in
general the answer to that question is internal to one’s conceptual frame-
work. That conclusion casts a starkly deflationary shadow on the whole
first-order debate, as well as on the higher-order debate itself. In this and
the following section I will argue that a sufficiently robust form of logical
realism—the view that there is one true logic—is able to avoid deflationism
about quantum MI. Although I am going to cast logical realism in terms of
naturalness, similar arguments could be provided mutatis mutandis on the
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basis of alternative accounts.18
One important qualification about the foregoing discussion is that the
notion of verbal disagreement was characterized in the style of Hirsch. How-
ever, Ted Sider has argued that Hirsch’s conditions are necessary, although
not jointly sufficient for a dispute to count as verbal. Sider’s strategy to
evade deflationism in a number of disputes rests on two premises: that (I)
the world is endowed with a fundamental structure; and that (II) words get
their meanings partly in virtue of what the world’s fundamental structure
is like.
Premise I is precisified in Lewis [26] by means of the notion of a natural
property—roughly, a property which gets referred to in the best description
of the actual goings-on. Candidates to being natural in Lewis’ sense are first-
order properties of fundamental physics such as mass, charge, etc. Although
naturalness is typically treated as primitive, there is a number of key roles
that Lewis attributed to the class of natural properties, such as making for
qualitative similarity, as well as defining a (minimal) supervenience base.
Moreover, naturalness comes in degrees: properties are natural simpliciter
when they are perfectly natural; property η is at least as natural as property
θ just in case the shortest definition of η in purely natural terms is not longer
than the shortest definition of θ in purely natural terms.
Sider [38] has put forward a generalization of Lewis’ program by coun-
tenancing not only first-order natural properties, but other kinds of items
too, such as properties and operations of any order—the semantic values
of quantifiers, connectives, and so on.19 In particular, Sider thinks that a
logical constant such as ‘not’ has a metaphysically elite meaning, a perfectly
natural operation mapping facts to facts—likewise for ‘and’, ‘all’, ‘some’ and
other bits of ideology. The one true logic—the one that carves the space
of possibility at its joints—is the logic whose constants are interpreted in
terms of natural operations only. Since we are only concerned with logical
spaces for sentential languages, I will countenance just two sorts of natural
items: facts, and operations on facts.
Premise II is part of a metasemantic doctrine known as reference mag-
18For an assessment of the metaphysical underpinnings of logical realism see McSweeney
[33].
19In fact, Sider’s own formulation of naturalness is quasi-syntactical, insofar as it em-
ploys a primitive ‘structural’ operator applying to linguistic items (predicates, operators
etc), rather than worldly items (properties, operations etc). Although Sider’s formula-
tion enjoys greater generality, as it does not presuppose any particular metaphysics of
higher-order entities, due to my concern with MI I will stick to a worldly formulation in
accordance with the Lewisean spirit.
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netism (Lewis [26] [27], cf. Merrill [34]), according to which of all candidate
meanings for a term, ceteris paribus we should regard the most natural as
providing the correct interpretation. If the assignment of semantic values
meets such externalist constraints, the substantivity of a dispute is going to
be a function of what the world is fundamentally like.
We can now see how Hirsch’s characterization can be strengthened by
implementing I and II. Let LC ,LQ be interpreted languages spoken by C,Q,
respectively, and ¬p a sentence in the common vocabulary. According to
Sider, the two parties are said to have a verbal disagreement about the truth
of ¬p just in case:20
1. there is a two-way paraphrase between LC and LQ;
2. ¬p is true-in-LC iff it is not true-in-LQ;
3. the interpretation-in-LC of ¬ is just as natural as the interpretation-
in-LQ of ¬, and neither interpretation is less natural than any other
candidate interpretation of ¬.
In particular, if there is a unique perfectly natural negation meaning,
disagreement about the truth of ¬p cannot be verbal, since the interpretation
of negation will default to that meaning in both languages (provided that the
languages coincide in their interpretation of the remaining terms occurring
in p). The above characterization of substantivity applies mutatis mutandis
to debates involving sentences governed by other operators.
The import of the new characterization of substantivity for the present
debate could not be overstated. For if either complementation or orthocom-
plementation is natural (and not both), clause (3) of Sider’s characterization
is not satisfied, and the disagreement between classical and quantum logi-
cian concerning the status of MI is going to be substantive. Allow me to
elaborate.
5.2 MI revisited
In section 2 I defined MI as the phenomenon arising just when some fact is
such that neither it nor its negation obtains. However, it should be clear by
now that there are multiple ways of carving logical space, depending on a
choice of facts and relations over facts. In particular, since there are mul-
tiple nonequivalent operations that can play the negation role, the original
definition of MI is ambiguous.
20For an alternative way of implementing I and II in a definition of verbal disagreement,
see Torza [41].
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Once the Lewis-Sider machinery is in place, however, we can count on a
distinguished carving of logical space, which motivates the following revision:
ind∗. Metaphysical indeterminacy is said to occur if (i) there is a fact such
that neither it nor its negation obtains, and (ii) the relevant negation
operation is natural.
Let us take stock. When the MI debate is approached from a metameta-
physical perspective, a key question is whether the debate is substantive.
On a Hirschean construal of substantivity, the MI debate is verbal, and—
horribile dictu—the relevant notion of indeterminacy is not even objective.
As we saw, however, such a deflationary moral is not inescapable, for if we
buy the Lewis-Sider metaphysical-cum-metasemantic package, the substan-
tivity of the MI debate depends on what candidate meanings are available
for ‘not’.
In the next section I will delve into the question of whether complemen-
tation or orthocomplementation is natural. If either is (but not both), the
disagreement between classical and quantum logician is going to be sub-
stantive; and which operation is natural will decide, via ind∗, whether the
quantum world is indeterminate. This development exhibits an interesting
interplay between metaphysics and metametaphysics. For we started off by
asking the higher-order question whether the first-order debate about quan-
tum indeterminacy is substantive; we learned that the answer to the higher-
order question depends on a first-order question, namely how fine-grained
the world’s structure is; and now we are about to see that the properties of
that structure may end up deciding the first-order debate about quantum
indeterminacy. Let us take a closer look.
6 Logical realism
In this section I turn to two key constraints that have been associated with
naturalness, but first a few preliminary notions need to be introduced. As
we already know, if W is the set of all possible worlds (states), a logical
space S on W is specified by a set of facts and operations, as well as a
relation of obtaining at a world (section 3). For S,S ′ logical spaces on W ,
and P, P ′ facts in S and S ′, respectively, P is said to be equivalent to P ′
if, for all w ∈ W , P obtains at w in S iff P ′ obtains at w in S ′. (When
facts are sets of worlds and the obtaining-at relation is set membership, as
is being assumed here, factual equivalence will collapse into set identity.)
Call a logical space S fundamental when every fact in S either is natural,
or is built up recursively by the application of natural operations to natural
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facts. For example, consider a quantum logical space Q, and suppose that:
(i) facts expressed by atomic categorical sentences are natural—these are,
intuitively, the facts corresponding to the application of natural properties to
quantum particles, such as this photon having that particular position; (ii)
logical operations (orthocomplementation, intersection) are natural. Then,
Q will be fundamental provided that every fact in it either is expressed by
an atomic categorical sentence, or is built up recursively from the applica-
tion of quantum-logical operations to facts expressed by atomic categorical
sentences. Intuitively, attributing fundamentality to Q intends to capture
the thesis that quantum logic carves the space of possibility at its joints.
I am now going to introduce two constraints on naturalness. The first
constraint guarantees that every fact in any space is reducible to some fact
in a fundamental space (cf. Sider [38, ch. 7]):
completeness. Let logical space S on W be fundamental. Then, for
every logical space S ′ on W , every fact in S ′ is equivalent to some fact
in S.
Now, let the Best System be the true axiomatic theory of the world that
strikes the best balance with respect to selected epistemic virtues, such as
strength and simplicity (Lewis [25] [26]). The second constraint provides
an epistemic criterion of naturalness for properties and operations (cf. Sider
[38, ch. 2.3]):
indispensability. We should regard an operation (or a property) η as
natural just in case η is picked out by a primitive term in the language
of the Best System.21
This condition tells us that the epistemically most virtuous theory is the
place where we should look for evidence of naturalness. Armed with the
above two principles, I now return to the case of quantum MI.
All of the best scientific theories currently at our disposal are expressed
in the language of classical mathematics. As long as such theories provide a
glimpse of what the Best System looks like, we have reason to believe that the
Best System too is formulated in classical mathematics. indispensability
allows us to infer that the classical operations of negation, disjunction and
conjunction are natural—in other words, that the one true logic is classical.
21This formulation of the criterion presupposes that the Best System is unique, which
is highly unlikely. I am setting aside this complication, although the interested reader
can see Donaldson [17], Torza [41, sec. 3] for discussion and alternative formulations of
indispensability.
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It can be concluded that the debate on quantum MI is substantive, and is
decided in favor of the classicist.22
The above line of thought is defeasible, however. For all we know, the fact
that our current epistemically most virtuous theories are phrased against the
backdrop of classical logic is a merely historical contingency. In fact, it might
well be that the Best System looks very different from any contemporary
scientific theory, not only in the way of empirical content but also of logi-
cal form—as the advocates of intuitionistic mathematics have long argued,
for example. So, the possibility that the one true logic turns out to be
nonclassical is not conclusively ruled out.
Be that as it may, there is a second, powerful argument against the thesis
that quantum logic carves the space of possibility at its joints. Given the
set W of possible states (vectors) in a Hilbert space, let C be a classical
logical space on W , and Q a quantum logical space on W . Suppose by way
of reductio that Q is fundamental, and let P be the fact expressed-in-LC
by ‘e is not z-spin up’. completeness entails that P is equivalent to some
fact in Q. Since P is not a closed set, however, there is no P ′ in Q having
as members the same vectors as P . So, no fact in Q is equivalent to P .
Contradiction.
Notice that the quantum logician cannot block the reductio by claiming
that since ‘e is not z-spin up’ as uttered by the classicist does not pick
out a closed set, it fails to express a fact. For, as seen in section 4, that
sentence can be paraphrased into the quantum logician’s language as “e is
z-spin up’ is not true’. The moral is that, although the quantum logician
regards Q as the correct space for interpreting the categorical language on
W , she must also acknowledge the existence of extra facts on W in order to
provide an interpretation for noncategorical statements. Since those extra
facts do not correspond to closed sets, the thesis that Q is fundamental
violates completeness. Thus, the debate on quantum MI is either verbal,
or is won by the classicist.
But all is not lost for the quantum logician. completeness is a de-
manding constraint, as it requires that all facts should be reducible one
by one to fundamental facts. We could instead adopt a weaker requirement
such that the obtaining facts should be collectively reducible to fundamental
facts. As it happens, a view in this vicinity has been articulated within the
literature on metaphysical ground. For, although it is standard to assume
that grounding is a many-one relation, in such a way that a fact is grounded
22Cf. Sider [38, sec. 9.6.2] for a parallel argument to the effect that classical first-order
quantification is natural.
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singularly (if at all), it has been argued that we should regard grounding as
a many-many relation instead. The latter view has been defended by Das-
gupta [16] in the context of a structuralist view of reality. On that view, the
ungrounded facts are qualitative (i.e., involving no particular individuals),
and the nonqualitative facts are grounded in the qualitative not singularly,
but collectively. Structuralist concerns aside, the gist of Dasgupta’s point is
that in order for the derivative facts to have a ground, it suffices that they be
grounded collectively, rather than individually. Once that moral is carried
over into naturalness territory, it should be clear that completeness is too
demanding, and that for the spirit of the principle to be satisfied it suffices
that the totality of obtaining facts should be reducible collectively to facts
in fundamental logical space. Let us implement this idea.
Call quantum states indistinguishable when they cannot be told apart by
any possible experiment. Here is a notion of factual equivalence which gener-
alizes the previous one: for S,S ′ logical spaces on W , and P,P′ sets of facts
in S and S ′, respectively, P is said to be collectively empirically equivalent
to P′ if, for all w ∈W , each P ∈ P obtains in S at some state indistinguish-
able from w iff each P ′ ∈ P′ obtains in S ′ at some state indistinguishable
from w. Roughly, sets of facts are collectively empirically equivalent just in
case they obtain at the same states up to indistinguishability.
completeness can now be replaced with the weaker requirement of
collective completeness, which is defined as follows:
c-completeness. Let logical space S on W be fundamental. Then, for
every logical space S ′ on W , and every w ∈ W , the set of facts ob-
taining at w in S ′ is collectively empirically equivalent to some set of
facts obtaining at w in S.
Let C,Q be classical and quantum logical spaces, respectively, on a set
of quantum states W . It can be proven that Q is collectively complete
relative to C (see sec. A.4 of the appendix). Namely, the collection of all
classical facts obtaining simpliciter is collectively empirically equivalent to
the singleton of the quantum fact which corresponds to the closed set having
as members all vectors indistinguishable from |ψ@〉. That quantum fact is
expressed by an atomic categorical sentence of quantum mechanics.
The above result guarantees that quantum logical space is collectively
complete with respect to the classical one. But it is easy to see that the
converse result holds, as well. Therefore, considerations of collective com-
pleteness, which are stringent but not too stringent, do not tip the balance
of the MI debate either way. We can conclude that, if the disagreement is
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substantive, we have not found any conclusive evidence for adjudicating the
dispute.
7 Coda : alternative accounts of MI
As I mentioned at the end of section 2, the present characterization of MI
differs from the two most influential alternatives: the precisificational ac-
count of Barnes and Williams [5], and the determinable-based account of
Wilson [50]. In this section I explain why I have not adopted either of those
readily available views.
According to the Barnes-Williams (BW) approach, MI occurs just when
the world is unsettled. The notion of unsettledness is captured by means
of the standard distinction between actual world, the concrete object to
which we all belong, and representational, aka ersatz worlds. Ersatz worlds
can be modeled either linguistically, as maximal consistent sets of sentences
in a precise world-making language, or by means of alternative representa-
tional machinery. The BW account tells us that the world is metaphysically
indeterminate just in case it is indeterminate which ersatz world (ontic pre-
cisification) is true.
To start with, the BW account fails to meet the constraint, laid out in
section 2, that MI should be defined solely by reference to worldly items, and
not by reference to any representational items. Indeed, the BW characteri-
zation does not say anything directly about what the world must be like in
order for MI to take place, but limits itself to saying what a representation
of an indeterminate world must be like.23
Second, and most importantly, the BW account is incompatible with
quantum MI (Darby [14], Skow [39]). Indeed, the scenario wherein an elec-
tron e has z-spin up and indeterminate y-spin is modeled in terms of two
ersatz worlds w,w′ such that (i) e has z-spin up according to both w and w′;
(ii) e has y-spin up according to w and y-spin down according to w′. But
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle tells us that (ii) is a quantum-mechanical
impossibility, and so that there are no such ersatz worlds as w,w′.24
23Barnes [4] discusses an alternative definition of MI to the effect that, roughly, MI
occurs just in case there is a sentence p and a fact F such that F is a truthmaker for p,
and it is indeterminate whether F exists in actuality. Since the definition quantifies over
sentences, it also fails to satisfy my constraint.
24A variation on the BW approach that restores the possibility of quantum MI by
rejecting the precisificational account while retaining the machinery of ersatz worlds is
put forward in Torza [40]. For further discussion of the BW approach vis-à-vis quantum
MI, see Calosi and Wilson [9]. Darby and Pickup [15] have tried to save the precisificational
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A prima facie more promising strategy for modeling quantum indeter-
minacy is the determinable-based account developed in Wilson [50], and
applied to the quantum case in Calosi and Wilson [9] [10]. On this view,
MI occurs just when an object has some determinable property θ (such as
z-spin) but no unique determinate of θ (such as up and down).
Three facts about the determinable-based account are relevant here.
First of all, the account allows for two ways in which something can be
metaphysically indeterminate: gappy indeterminacy, whereby something
has a determinable θ but no determinate of θ; and glutty indeterminacy,
whereby something has θ as well as multiple determinates of θ. Second,
Wilson formulates her account of MI against the background of classical
bivalent logic, thus presupposing that logical space is classical. Third, the
account is defined by appealing to a metaphysical picture, developed in
Wilson [49], wherein determinables are irreducible to the respective deter-
minates. The rationale for that assumption is that, contrary to tradition,
the determinable-based account requires the instantiation pattern of a deter-
minable to be independent of the instantiation pattern of its determinates.
The irreducibility of determinables is made precise in terms of the following
condition:
w1. Determinables are not analyzable in terms of their maximally specific
determinates.25
I take it that a determinable is analyzable in terms of its maximally specific
determinates if and only if for something to have the determinable just is for
it to have a suitable compound property defined in terms of its maximally
specific determinates. Of course there are all sorts of potential strategies for
reducing determinables according to that schema. Here is one: for something
to have a determinable just is for it to have one of its maximally specific
determinates. More precisely, let θ be a determinable, and θ1, . . . , θn its
maximally specific determinates. Then, θ is analyzable in terms of θ1, . . . , θn
relative to logical space X if, for every individual a, [a is θ]X = [a is θ1
or . . . or a is θn]X . Since w1 rules that a determinable is irreducible to
its determinates, a fortiori it rules that a determinable is irreducible to a
disjunction of its determinates.
view by appealing to situation semantics; but see Corti [13] for a critique of the situation-
theoretic approach.
25“Determinables are not analyzable as disjunctions (or indeed, as any construction of
maximal determinates); and [. . . ] it is core to a determinable-based approach to MI that
determinables are not so reducible” (Calosi and Wilson [10]).
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By formulating her account against the backdrop of a classical and bi-
valent logic, Wilson aims to show that making sense of MI does not require
any logical revisionism—a goal she shares with Barnes and Williams. I am
happy to acknowledge that, other things being equal, preserving classical
logic can be regarded as a theoretical virtue. But as discussed in section
3.2, things are not equal in the context of the orthodox interpretation of
quantum mechanics, which offers reasons for identifying facts with closed
sets of vectors, and so for preferring quantum to classical logic. In effect,
it appears that Calosi and Wilson are not prepared to rule out quantum
logic either, since they believe that the quantum-logical approach “is open
to a proponent of Determinable-based MI ” (Calosi and Wilson [10]). As it
turns out, however, quantum logic is incompatible with the determinable-
based account, since the latter entails the following condition relative to a
quantum logical space Q:
w2. Some determinables are analyzable in terms of their maximally specific
determinates.
In order to see that, let electron e be the only particle in a system
associated with quantum logical space Q, and consider the determinable-
involving fact P := [e has z-spin]Q. In virtue of being a quantum fact about
e, P lives in Q; and in virtue of living in Q, P is a closed set of vectors.
Moreover, P is a necessary fact in Q.26 For either e does or does not have
a determinate z-spin value. If it does then P obtains. This follows from
a thesis known as Determinable Inheritance—if x has a determinate of a
determinable, then x has the determinable—which is regarded as definitional
of the determination relation, and which Calosi and Wilson [10] appear to
endorse. And if the z-spin value of e is indeterminate, Wilson’s definition of
MI entails that P obtains, whereas both [e has z-spin up]Q and [e has z-spin
down]Q fail to obtain (or else both obtain).
But here is another fact living in the same logical space: P ′ := [e has
z-spin up or e has z-spin down]Q. Because [e has z-spin up]Q and [e has
z-spin down]Q jointly span Q, P ′ is a necessary fact in Q (cf. sec. 3.2). And
since quantum facts are sets of vectors, by the extensionality of set mem-
bership there is just one necessary fact, hence P = P ′. It follows that in Q
the z-spin determinable is analyzable as a disjunction of its maximally spe-
cific determinates. This establishes that the the determinable-based account
entails w2 relative to quantum logical space Q.
26That a determinable-involving fact such as P is necessary for the system at hand is not
uncontroversial. Indeed, some have argued that, say, z-spin talk is simply unintelligible
when e’s z-spin value is indeterminate (cf. Albert [2, p. 38]).
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Since w2 contradicts w1, we must conclude that the metaphysics of irre-
ducible determinables underpinning Wilson’s account is incompatible with
quantum logic. However, the question whether the logical space defined by a
quantum system is classical as opposed to quantum is hardly something that
could be settled based on armchair hypotheses regarding the determination
relation. Therefore, barring independent reasons for ruling out quantum
logic, the determinable-based approach should either be decoupled from the
metaphysical assumptions that lead to w1, or abandoned.
8 Conclusions
I have tried to shed light on the question whether orthodox quantum me-
chanics leads to MI by discussing the logical, semantic, and broadly method-
ological presuppositions of the debate. I have argued that the dispute is ver-
bal if we adopt a Hirschean account of substantivity; but that it need not be
so if we embrace Sider’s naturalness-based account of substantivity. Given
the latter approach, and assuming that the disagreement is substantive, can
anything be said in order to tip the balance of the debate between classical
and quantum logician either way? Some prima facie reasonable constraints
on naturalness entail that the classicist is right, and MI does not arise. As I
argued, however, there are reasons to believe that those constraints should
be weakened, to the effect that the dispute remains very much open. Fi-
nally, I discussed two alternative and influential characterizations of MI, and
argued that neither of them is suitable for framing the quantum MI debate.27
A Appendix
A.1 The paraphrase f
It needs to be proven that the function f from section 4, which maps cat-
egorical LQ-sentences to LC sentences, preserves coarse-grained content.
The proof is by induction on the syntactical complexity of categorical LQ-
27I would like to thank Samuel Fletcher, David Glick, Peter Lewis, Elias Okon and the
UNAM Metaphysics Seminar for their helpful feedback, as well as audiences at the Quan-
tum Indeterminacy workshop at Dartmouth College, and the 2020 Meeting of the APA
Central in Chicago. I am also grateful to two anonymous referees for their thoughtful and
generous comments. This work was supported by a PASPA-dgapa sabbatical fellowship
which allowed me to spend two semesters at Rutgers University.
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sentences. (I will explicitly state the justification of a step only when the
step requires appealing to a new principle.)
(AtQ) We need to show that for any atomic categorical LQ-sentence p, and
any choice of |ψ@〉:
p is LQ-true iff Pr([p]C , |ψ@〉) = 1 is LC-true.
Proof: p is LQ-true iff TQ([p]Q, |ψ@〉) (by definition of LQ-truth),
iff Pr([p]Q, |ψ@〉) = 1 (by cr together with its converse, which is
trivial), iff Pr([p]C , |ψ@〉) = 1 (since [p]C = [p]Q for atomic p), iff
Pr([p]C , |ψ@〉) = 1 is LC-true (since C assigns the correct probabili-
ties to classical facts).
(¬Q) We need to show that, for any categorical LQ-sentence P , and any
choice of |ψ@〉:
¬P is LQ-true iff Pr([f(P )]C , |ψ@〉) = 0 is LC-true.
Proof: ¬P is LQ-true iff TQ([¬P ]Q, |ψ@〉), iff TQ(−Q[P ]Q, |ψ@〉), iff
Pr(−Q[P ]Q, |ψ@〉) = 1, iff Pr(−Q[f(P )]C , |ψ@〉) = 1 (by inductive
hypothesis), iff Pr([f(P )]C , |ψ@〉) = 0, iff Pr([f(P )]C , |ψ@〉) = 0 is
LC-true.
(∧Q) We need to show that, for any categorical LQ-sentences S, P and any
choice of |ψ@〉:
S ∧ P is LQ-true iff both Pr([f(S)]C , |ψ@〉) = 1 and
Pr([f(P )]C , |ψ@〉) = 1 are LC-true.
Proof: S∧P is LQ-true iff TQ([S∧P ]Q, |ψ@〉), iff TQ([S]QuQ[P ]Q, |ψ@〉),
iff Pr([S]QuQ [P ]Q, |ψ@〉) = 1, iff Pr([f(S)]CuQ [f(P )]C , |ψ@〉) = 1 (by
inductive hypothesis), iff Pr([f(S)]C uC [f(P )]C , |ψ@〉) = 1 (because
uC = uQ), iff both Pr([f(S)]C , |ψ@〉) = 1 and Pr([f(P )]C , |ψ@〉) = 1,
iff both Pr([f(S)]C , |ψ@〉) = 1 and Pr([f(P )]C , |ψ@〉) = 1 are LC-true.
A.2 The paraphrase g
It needs to be proven that the function g from section 4, which maps cat-
egorical LC-sentences to LQ sentences, preserves coarse-grained content.
The proof is by induction on the syntactical complexity of categorical LC-
sentences. (Once again, I will explicitly state the justification of a step only
when a new principle is appealed to.)
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(AtC) We need to show that for any atomic categorical LC-sentence p, and
any choice of |ψ@〉:
p is LC-true iff T (p) is LQ-true.
Proof: p is LC-true iff TC([p]C , |ψ@〉) (by definition of LC-truth), iff
TC([p]Q, |ψ@〉) (since [p]C = [p]Q for atomic p), iff T (p) is LQ-true (by
definition of T ).
(¬C) We need to show that, for any categorical LC-sentence P , and any
choice of |ψ@〉:
¬P is LC-true iff ∼ g(P ) is LQ-true.
Proof: ¬P is LC-true iff TC([¬P ]C , |ψ@〉), iff TC(−C [P ]C , |ψ@〉), iff not
TC([P ]C , |ψ@〉), iff not TC([g(P )]Q, |ψ@〉) (by inductive hypothesis), iff
g(P ) is not LQ-true, iff ∼ g(P ) is LQ-true (by definition of ∼).
(∧C) We need to show that, for any categorical LC-sentences S, P and any
choice of |ψ@〉:
S ∧ P is LC-true iff g(S)&g(P ) is LQ-true.
Proof: analogous to the case of (¬C).
A.3 Verbal disagreement about MI
We want to show that the dispute between classicists (LC-speakers) and
quantum logicians (LQ-speakers) about whether quantum mechanics leads
to MI is verbal in Hirsch’s sense (sec. 4). A rigorous proof that the dispute is
verbal will require (i) introducing an indeterminacy operator in both object
languages; (ii) extending the paraphrase schemes f , g in order to account
for statements of indeterminacy; (iii) showing that, for some categorical
sentence p, ‘it is metaphysically indeterminate whether p’ is true-in-LC iff
it is not true-in-LQ.
Let us start by expanding both LC and LQ with a sentential operator
∇ with the intended meaning ‘it is metaphysically indeterminate whether’
as defined by ind. We then extend f to a mapping f∗ from categorical
LQ-sentences to LC sentences such that:
(∇Q) If P is a categorical sentence of LQ, then f∗(∇P ) is ¬Pr([f∗(P )]C , |ψ@〉)
= 1 ∧ ¬Pr([f∗(P )]C , |ψ@〉) = 0
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whereas f∗(P ) = f(P ) if P is atomic, negated, or conjunctive. We need to
show that for any categorical LQ-sentence P , and any choice of |ψ@〉:
∇P is LQ-true iff ¬Pr([f∗(P )]C , |ψ@〉) = 1∧¬Pr([f∗(P )]C , |ψ@〉) =
0 is LC-true.
Proof: ∇P is LQ-true iff not TQ([P ]Q, |ψ@〉) and not TQ([¬P ]Q, |ψ@〉), iff
not TQ([P ]Q, |ψ@〉) and not TQ(−Q[P ]Q, |ψ@〉), iff not Pr([P ]Q, |ψ@〉) = 1
and not Pr(−Q[P ]Q, |ψ@〉) = 1, iff not Pr([f∗(P )]C , |ψ@〉) = 1 and not
Pr(−Q[f∗(P )]C , |ψ@〉) = 1 (by inductive hypothesis), iff not Pr([f∗(P )]C , |ψ@〉)
= 1 and not Pr([f∗(P )]C , |ψ@〉) = 0, iff ¬Pr([f∗(P )]C , |ψ@〉) = 1∧¬Pr([f∗(P )]C , |ψ@〉) =
0 is LC-true.
We now extend g to a mapping g∗ from categorical LC-sentences to LQ
sentences such that
(∇C) If P is a categorical sentence of LC , then g∗(∇P ) is 0 = 1
whereas g∗(P ) = g(P ) if P is atomic, negated, or conjunctive. We need to
show that for any categorical LC-sentence P , and any choice of |ψ@〉:
∇P is LC-true iff 0=1 is LQ-true.
Since LC is bivalent, the proof is trivial. This concludes the proof that there
is a two-way paraphrase between expanded LQ and expanded LC .
The final step is to find a categorical sentence p in the common fragment
of LC and LQ such that ∇p is true-in-LQ and not true-in-LC . Relative to a
single-electron system in a superposition of z-spin up and z-spin down, one
such sentence is ‘e is z-spin up.’ This suffices to show that the disagreement
between C and Q concerning quantum MI is verbal in Hirsch’s sense.
A.4 Collective completeness of Q relative to C
Let C,Q be classical and quantum logical spaces, respectively, on a set of
quantum states W . We need to show that Q is collectively complete rela-
tive to C, which is to say, that the collection of all classical facts obtaining
at |ψ@〉 is collectively empirically equivalent to the singleton of the quan-
tum fact which corresponds to the closed set having as members all vectors
indistinguishable from |ψ@〉. The proof is as follows.
In quantum mechanics, states differing by a scalar verify the same ex-
perimental facts. Therefore, quantum states are indistinguishable just in
case they differ by a scalar. Let P be the set of facts obtaining at |ψ@〉
in C. Consider now the set of facts Q = {Q} in Q, where Q is the set
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of unitary vectors indistinguishable from |ψ@〉. If Q obtains at some state
indistinguishable from a state |ψ〉, then |ψ@〉 and |ψ〉 are indistinguishable.
Therefore, every P ∈ P obtains at some state, namely |ψ@〉, which is in-
distinguishable from |ψ〉. Conversely, let every P ∈ P obtain at some state
indistinguishable from a state |ψ〉. Since Q ∈ P, |ψ@〉 and |ψ〉 are indis-
tinguishable. Therefore, Q obtains at some state, namely |ψ@〉, which is
indistinguishable from |ψ〉. QED.
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